In order to interpret the notion of philía in the Lysis I relate it to the
notions of oikeîos and syngéneia (Men. 81b, passim). The main problem of the dialogue
lies in the difficulty to relate “affinity” with “likeness” (hómoion: 222a-e). If
the “good” is the “first friend” (220a), the one who aims at it can neither be like it,
nor its contrary: if he were like it, he would lack motive to desire it; if he were its
contrary, he would reject it. Beneath the aporia hide the difficult problems relating
good, evil and contrariety. The first one is solved in the Timaeus with the creation
of the living cosmos: while immortal soul is created by the demiurge, mortal souls
and their bodies are shaped by the created gods (41a-d). The second one is solved in
the Sophist through the reformulation of the negative as difference. This solution is
anticipated in the Lysis through the interposition of “something neither good nor bad”
(218b-c) between good and evil, associated in several dialogues to the conception of
evil as “ignorance of the good”. (Ti. 86d-e; see Sph. 228c; Ti. 86b-90d; see R. 353e).
